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Theoretical work suggests an ambiguous relationship between the strength of institutions and the 
distribution of access to finance. Using a sample of listed firms from 70 countries, this study 
constructs country-level measures of inequality in access to external finance and explores its 
relation to institutions. We show that inequality of access is positively related to financial 
development as well as inequality in the distribution of firm size, firm revenue, and residents’ 
incomes. Countries with stronger investor protection for equity and debt have higher inequality in 
equity and debt financing respectively, presumably as a result of higher efficiency in fund allocation. 
Finally, we find that the historical determinants of institutions, including the civil law tradition and 
the disease environment encountered by colonizers, are negative related to inequality in access to 
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 Inequality in access to external equity is positively related to the anti-director rights index 
 Inequality in access to external debt is positively related to the credit rights index 
 Civil law and mortality rates of colonizers are positively related to funding inequality 
 Funding inequality is positively related to financial development 









1. Introduction  
Given the importance of finance to economic growth (See King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997, 
2005), the literature extensively explores the reason why some countries have better institutions as 
indicated by strong laws and private property rights that facilitate financial development. Law and 
finance theory argues that English common-law countries tend to have better investor protections 
and thus larger capital markets (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Endowment theory contends that 
hospitable endowments encountered by European colonizers favored the establishment of secure 
property rights, and thus more developed stock markets (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2003). 
While certain measures of financial development, such as private credit divided by total credit or 
gross domestic product (GDP)1, consider the distribution of assets between private and state 
sectors, it is still not clear how institutions shape the distribution of access to external finance 
among individual firms. This study intends to shed light on this under-researched aspect of capital 
markets.  
Claessens and Perotti (2007) provide a conceptual review of the emerging literature on the 
distribution of access to finance. They report that the distribution of external financing is skewed 
and varies greatly across countries and firms. They also discuss its consequences such as reduced 
entrepreneurial activities and individual welfare, and conjecture that a weaker institutional 
environment may lead to barriers to broader access to finance. This “inclusion hypothesis” states 
that improved institutions can ease the unequal distribution by reducing barriers to accesss, 
especially for poorer individuals and small businesses. At the same time, the law and finance theory 
(La Porta et al., 1997) also predicts that more developed institutions constrain the misuse of funds 
and ensure that only good projects enjoy access to finance. Schumpeter (1912) points out that 
well-functioning banks identify and finance the entrepreneurs with the best chances. In line with 
these predictions, Wurgler (2000) provides evidence that developed financial markets, which tend 
                                                 
1 King and Levine (1993) contend that larger private credit indicates that financial systems provide more services. 
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to have strong protection for minority investors, are associated with a better allocation of capital, 
as reflected in lower overinvestment in declining industries. This “efficiency hypothesis” implies a 
positive link between developed institutions and uneven distribution of funding across companies, 
due to better access to funds for high-NPV ventures, and less access for low-NPV ventures. Given 
these differing predictions of the distributional effects of stronger institutions, the question of their 
net effect on inequality of access to finance is timely and important.  
 Institutions are found to influence other aspects of inequality. Chong and Gradstein (2007) 
show that poor institutional quality is conducive to income inequality, and that the reverse holds 
as well. Piketty and Saez (2014) argue that institutions determine which of several powerful forces 
push the direction of income inequality over the long run. Kumar et al. (1999) document that the 
strength of institutions is negatively related to the dispersion in firm size within an industry. Cabral 
and Mata (2003) refer to financial constraints to explain the distribution of firm size. Since access 
to external finance is a possible channel that influences the effects discussed above, we also predict 
that inequality of access is associated with unequal distribution of firm size and individual income.   
To perform our analysis, we construct sample of 633,119 firm-year observations from 
Worldscope covering 70 counties between 2004 and 2017. We follow the intuition of La Porta et 
al. (1997) in measuring firm-level access to equity (debt) finance by market capitalization (total 
liability) divided by total asset. A higher ratio suggests a stronger ability to raise capital. We then 
estimate the yearly country-level inequality of access to finance by a) the coefficient of variation, 
b) the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and c) the Gini coefficient of the market capitalization or 
total liability divided by total asset 2 . These are commonly used measures for inequality or 
concentration, and each has its pros and cons. For example, the Gini index and coefficient of 
variation are sensitive to firms with almost no funds, while the Herfindahl index is almost 
unaffected by them.  
                                                 
2 Estimation of the Gini index is based on Karagiannis and Kovacevic (2000).  
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We first show that inequality in external financing for firms is positively associated with 
financial development in the relevant country, and with inequality in the distribution of firm size 
and revenue, and the incomes of residents. We then provide evidence that better protection of the 
rights of equity and debt investors is associated with higher cross-firm inequality in access to 
finance, using the measures described above. This supports the “efficiency hypothesis”, that strong 
institutions enhance the efficiency of resource allocation (Wurgler, 2000). Specifically, the anti-
director rights index (creditor rights index) is positively related to inequality in equity (debt) 
financing. In addition, the civil-law tradition and a higher mortality rate of colonizers, both 
indicators of weaker institutions, are associated with lower inequality of access to finance. We 
emphasise that our results are not necessarily inconsistent with the view of Claessens and Perotti 
(2007) and others, that stronger institutions promote access to finance among poorer individuals 
and micro-ventures. Our interpretation is that, among listed firms (which are the agents we study), 
stronger institutions imply provision of funding that is better aligned to wealth-creating 
opportunities. This is associated with wealth inequality at the individual level, possibly arising from 
the extreme wealth of certain entrepreneurs, shareholders and executives. 
The study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this is the first study to document 
cross-firm inequality in access to finance and explore its determinants, adding to the emerging 
literature on the distribution of access (Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Second, we apply the law (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998) and endowment theories (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2003) to study 
inequality in access, which is an important dimension of financial development.  
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We employ several measures of the strength of institutions. We use two proxies of investor 
protection; Anti-Director Rights Index from Spamann (2010) reflects legal protection of equity 
investors, while Creditor Rights Index from Djankov et al. (2007) represents legal protection of debt 
investors. Civil Law is a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries with civil-law tradition and zero 
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otherwise, from La Porta et al. (2008). Mortality is the log of the annualized deaths per thousand 
European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19th century, from Beck et al. (2003). Finally, 
we use data from La Porta et al. (1999) which classify religion into four categories; Catholic, Muslim, 
Protestant and Other Religions are the percentage the population in a given country that belonged to 
the corresponding religion in 1980s. Control variables on economic development are from World 
Bank and Worldscope. Other variables relating to the institutional environment, such as 
Government Efficiency, Control of Corruption, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law, are obtained 
from The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank. Definition of 
variables and data sources are provided in the Appendix.  
We exclude country-year observations with less than 20 listed trading stocks. The final 
sample consists of 70 counties from 2004 and 2017. Figure 1 shows the degree of cross-firm 
inequality around the world as reflected by the sum of the coefficients of variation that we calculate 
for equity and debt financing. Online Appendix provides the full ranking list and evidence that 
financial development and inequality in access are positively correlated. Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 [Figure 1 insert here] & [Table 1 insert here]  
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Capital Inequality and Beyond 
First of all, we show that inequality of access to finance is linked to financial development, 
and inequality of firms and residents at the country level. Existing theories have not yet assembled 
the links. Panel A of Table 2 indicates a positive association between inequality of access and 
equity- and debt-market development. Panels B and C report that both equity and debt inequality 
have significantly positive coefficients in regressions of inequality on employee-based firm size, 
and firm revenue. The results are also economically significant. In panel C column (1) for example, 
a one standard deviation increase in the equity inequality (8.441) is associated with an increase of 
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0.38 (= 8.441×0.045) in the inequality of firm revenues, equivalent to 10.9% as a proportion of 
the sample mean. This result suggests that access to external equity is a possible determinant of 
firm size, and since firm size is related to the process of economic growth,3 the result potentially 
adds to our understanding of the finance-growth relationship.  
 Panel D shows that the coefficients of both equity and debt inequality are significantly 
positive in the regressions with individual income inequality as the dependent variable. The results 
complement the studies on the financial determinants of income inequality (e.g. Clarke et al., 2006; 
Beck et al., 2007). Access to finance could influence resident income through the channels of 
income on capital, salary, and entrepreneurship. A larger dispersion in the funding opportunities 
may exaggerate the heterogeneity of firms in terms of return and average salary, and the 
heterogeneity of entrepreneurs in terms of their ability to raise capital, which in turn increases 
income inequality.  
 [Table 2 insert here] 
3.2. Investor Protection and Inequality 
In Table 3 and 4, we regress our inequality measures of equity and debt financing on 
measures of investor protection. The coefficient on Anti-Director Rights Index (Table 3) is 
significantly positive, and on Civil Law (Table 4) is significantly negative, after controlling for 
economic and other institutional conditions. This suggests that investor protection increases the 
uneven distribution of funding opportunities. The results seem contradictory to the “inclusion 
hypothesis” of Claessens and Perotti (2007) developed through the discussion of poorer 
individuals and small firms, which predicts that unequal access to finance will arise from weak 
enforcement of private contracting. However, the results are in line with the notions of 
Schumpeter (1912) and Wurgler (2000) i.e. the “efficiency hypothesis” that well-functioning 
                                                 




financial intermediaries channel funds to entrepreneurs identified as having the best investment 
opportunities, and that strong investor protection can constrain the misuse of funds and improve 
the allocation of capital.  
 The coefficients on Catholic and Protestant are significantly positive in column (4) in Tables 
3 and 4. This is in line with Guiso et al. (2006) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) that Catholics and 
Protestants have a more negative attitude toward redistribution than those with no religion. Their 
attitude reflects a higher tolerance of inequality. When religion variables are included, the 
significance levels of investor protection diminish, which is in line with the argument in Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) that religion influences external financing through the channel of institutions.  
 [Table 3 & 4 insert here] 
3.3. Law Vs Endowment Theories  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 and 4 report the regression results for evaluating the law 
and endowment theories. We argue that both theories are applicable to the study of access to 
finance. The law and finance theory (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) focuses on the legal tradition: 
common law stresses private property rights and private market outcomes whereas civil law gives 
more priority to the rights of the state and societal preference (Liang and Renneboog, 2017). Poor 
investor protection and intervention from a powerful state can lead to less efficient allocation of 
resources, undermining the ability of the best firms in secure funding. This suggests that civil law 
countries may exhibit lower inequality in external financing.  
Endowment theory (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Beck et al., 2003) emphasizes that institutional 
development has been shaped by disease and geographic endowments encountered by European 
colonizers. In countries with a hostile initial environment, colonizers were less able to develop 
institutions that favor protection of private property rights and development of competitive 
financial markets. Feasibility of settlement therefore facilities the efficient allocation of resources. 
This view combined with the efficiency hypothesis predicts that mortality rate of European 
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colonizers is negatively related to institutional development, and negatively related to inequality in 
external financing.  
While the two theories suggest different influencing mechanisms, they are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, the coefficients on Civil Law and Mortality are significantly negative in the 
regressions of equity and debt inequality, rendering support to the predictions drawn from both 
theories. The results are of economic significance too. In Table 3 for example, a one standard 
deviation change in Mortality is associated with a 23.5% (= 1.13×1.026/4.934) change in equity 
inequality, as a proportion of mean inequality.  
When all the variables are incorporated in Column (5), the number of countries in the 
sample is reduced to 22 (25) in Table 3 (4), and only Mortality remains significant in Table 4, 
suggesting that the evidence for the endowment theory is more robust. When both investor 
protection and legal origin are incorporated in Columns (6-8), the coefficients on Civil Law remain 
significantly negative for alternative specifications of funding inequality.  
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 The literature on law and finance largely ignores the distributional effects of institutions 
on external financing. This study provides a first picture of cross-country differences in inequality 
in access to finance, and discusses their importance by showing links between access and other 
widely studied inequality indicators such as the distribution of firm size and revenue, and of 
residents’ incomes. We find that investor protection is an important determinant of funding 
inequality, in that stronger institutions promote allocation of resources. Finally, we show that 
historical determinants of institutional development, suggested by the law and endowment theories, 
matter for inequality of access.  
Following the conceptual review of Claessens and Perotti (2007), our exploratory study 
adds to work on the distribution of access to finance, which is still at an early stage. We encourage 
future studies to better understand the distributional aspects of capital markets, including their 
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determinants (e.g. the competition of financial intermediaries and information sharing) and effects 
(e.g. industry structure, the allocation of capital, and economic growth). By estimating the cross-
country industry-level funding inequality, future studies can explore the possible moderating 
effects of financial dependence (i.e. an industry’s technological demand for external financing). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Country Mean S.D. Min Max p25 Median p75 
Stock Market 739 54 84.11 139.72 4.63 1274.13 29.26 49.12 88 
Debt Market 834 62 79.59 57.08 11.05 450.39 42.26 66.85 97.89 
Gini(Size) 923 70 0.70 0.15 0.00 0.95 0.63 0.73 0.81 
CV(Revenue) 924 70 3.46 1.76 0.92 9.41 2.10 3.01 4.54 
Gini(Income) 528 37 35.45 7.54 23.70 64.80 30.05 34.00 39.65 
External Finance Inequality          
CV(Equity)  924 70 5.09 8.59 0.47 67.11 1.07 1.54 4.84 
HHI(Equity) 924 70 0.15 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.04 0.14 
Gini(Equity) 924 70 0.62 0.19 0.26 1.00 0.47 0.56 0.74 
CV(Debt)  924 70 4.73 9.84 0.19 85.20 0.56 0.76 3.13 
HHI(Debt) 924 70 0.11 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 
Gini(Debt) 924 70 0.44 0.23 0.11 1.00 0.29 0.36 0.52 
Institutional Environments          
Anti-Director Rights Index 616 45 3.08 1.33 0.00 5.00 2.00 3.00 4 
Creditor Rights Index 892 67 1.94 1.10 0.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 3 
Civil Law 924 70 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1 
Mortality 347 26 3.85 1.13 2.15 7.60 2.79 4.22 4.26 
Catholic 911 69 34.47 38.41 0.00 97.30 0.60 12.10 81 
Protestant 898 68 14.30 25.27 0.00 97.80 0.20 1.20 16.1 
Other Religions 898 68 33.42 34.53 0.40 100.00 4.10 18.58 63.8 
Controls          
Listed 924 70 685.00 1422.64 20.00 11068.00 93.50 214.50 597.5 
GDP per Capita 924 70 28792.47 20103.60 1215.02 98076.53 12041.44 24271.82 41615.3 
Government Effectiveness 924 70 8.41 1.96 3.00 13.00 7.00 8.00 10 
Control of Corruption 924 70 11.41 2.96 4.00 17.00 9.00 11.00 14 
Regulatory Quality 924 70 8.95 1.92 4.00 13.00 7.00 9.00 11 
Rule of Law 924 70 13.07 2.87 7.00 19.00 11.00 13.00 16 





Table 2: External Finance Inequality and Income Inequality 
This table presents the relation between external finance inequality and the financial development indicators (Panel A), the 
inequality of firm size (Panel B), firm revenue (Panel C) and resident income (Panel D). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Equity Inequality is proxied by CV(Equity) in column (1), HHI(Equity) in column (2) and Gini(Equity) in column (3). Debt Inequality 
is proxied by CV(Debt) in column (4), HHI(Debt) in column (5) and Gini(Debt) in column (6). Economic Control represents a set 
of economic development control variables including GDP per capita adjusted for PPP and the number of total listed 
companies. Institution Control represents a set of institutional environment control variables including indicators on government 
efficiency, control of corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law from World Government Indicators. Year dummy variables 
are included in all regressions and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Financial Development 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Stock Market Stock Market Stock Market Debt Market Debt Market Debt Market 
Equity Inequality 3.084*** 51.832*** 110.069***    
 [3.118] [2.612] [4.010]    
Debt Inequality    0.712** 21.760*** 23.474*** 
    [1.981] [2.768] [2.786] 
Economic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Countries 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Intercept 256.003*** 260.427*** 193.943*** 205.746*** 203.773*** 199.055*** 
 [4.579] [4.536] [3.908] [12.530] [12.420] [12.254] 
R-square 0.332 0.318 0.329 0.356 0.356 0.355 
Observation 739 739 739 834 834 834 
Panel B: Firm size inequality 
 Gini(Size) Gini(Size) Gini(Size) Gini(Size) Gini(Size) Gini(Size) 
Equity Inequality 0.002*** -0.024 0.103***    
 [5.771] [-1.205] [4.293]    
Debt Inequality    0.002*** 0.076*** 0.137*** 
    [5.286] [6.310] [9.611] 
Economic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Countries 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Intercept 0.809*** 0.788*** 0.750*** 0.792*** 0.786*** 0.755*** 
 [20.581] [19.676] [17.958] [19.939] [19.825] [19.388] 
R-square 0.338 0.330 0.343 0.338 0.340 0.360 
Observation 923 928 928 928 928 928 
Panel C: Firm revenues inequality 
 CV(Revenue) CV(Revenue) CV(Revenue) CV(Revenue) CV(Revenue) CV(Revenue) 
Equity Inequality 0.045*** 0.039 1.121***    
 [4.969] [0.218] [4.184]    
Debt Inequality    0.038*** 0.596*** 2.038*** 
    [4.414] [2.797] [8.630] 
Economic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Intercept 3.982*** 3.844*** 3.841*** 3.789*** 3.383*** 3.290*** 
 [8.175] [7.889] [7.626] [7.573] [6.456] [6.859] 
R-square 0.352 0.352 0.330 0.336 0.343 0.384 
Observation 924 929 929 929 929 929 
Panel D: Resident income inequality 
 Gini(Income) Gini(Income) Gini(Income) Gini(Income) Gini(Income) Gini(Income) 
Equity Inequality 0.109*** 1.883* 2.742**    
 [3.082] [1.893] [2.077]    
Debt Inequality    0.090*** 2.553*** 3.758*** 
    [3.571] [2.978] [3.653] 
Economic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Countries 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Intercept 25.049*** 25.130*** 23.898*** 24.684*** 24.289*** 24.029*** 
 [10.641] [10.644] [9.987] [10.495] [10.284] [10.079] 
R-square 0.646 0.644 0.644 0.646 0.646 0.649 
Observation 528 528 528 528 528 528 
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Table 3 External Finance Inequality – Equity  
This table presents the regression results of the determinants of the inequality in equity financing. The proxies for inequality of equity financing include CV(Equity) 
in column (1)-(6), HHI(Equity) in column (7) and Gini(Equity) in column (8). Anti-Director Rights Index measures the quality of legal protection on minority shareholders 
in a given country and ranges from 0-6. Civil Law is a dummy variable equals to one for countries with civil law system and zero otherwise. Mortality is the log of the 
annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19th century. Catholic is the percentage of the population of each country that 
belonged to the religion of “Roman Catholic”. Protestant is the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the religion of “Protestant”. Other 
Religions is the percentage of the population of each country which does not belong to the religion of “Roman Catholic, Protestant and Muslim”. Economic Control 
includes GDP per capita adjusted for PPP and the number of total listed companies. Institution Control includes indicators on government efficiency, control of 
corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law from World Government Indicators. Year dummy variables are included in all regressions and t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 CV(Equity)  CV(Equity)  CV(Equity)  CV(Equity)  CV(Equity)  CV(Equity)  HHI(Equity) Gini(Equity) 
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.991***    0.983*** 0.291 -0.005 0.024*** 
 [4.285]    [2.685] [1.193] [-0.358] [3.175] 
Civil Law  -2.627***   -0.325 -4.891*** -0.053* -0.052** 
 
 [-4.719]   [-0.290] [-5.307] [-1.870] [-2.537] 
Mortality   -1.026***  -0.273    
 
  [-2.689]  [-0.614]    
Catholic    0.021*** 0.034** 0.047*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
    [4.436] [2.004] [4.223] [6.786] [5.827] 
Protestant    0.018*** 0.052 0.039*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
    [2.595] [1.136] [2.843] [3.934] [3.285] 
Other Religions    0.011 0.003 -0.018 0.001*** 0.001** 
    [1.612] [0.114] [-1.342] [3.213] [2.451] 
Economic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Countries 45 70 26 68 22 45 45 45 
Intercept -1.244 -0.830 13.676*** -3.992* 9.158 1.932 -0.259* 0.400*** 
 [-0.406] [-0.417] [2.779] [-1.798] [1.190] [0.563] [-1.851] [4.177] 
R-square 0.507 0.504 0.645 0.490 0.652 0.544 0.099 0.254 





Table 4 External Finance Inequality – Debt 
This table presents the regression results of the determinants of the inequality in debt financing. The proxies of the inequality of debt financing include CV(Debt) in 
column (1)-(6), HHI(Debt) in column (7) and Gini(Debt) in column (8). Creditor Rights Index measures the quality of creditor right protection in a given country. Civil 
Law is a dummy variable equals to one for countries with civil law system and zero otherwise. Civil Law is a dummy variable equals to one for countries with civil law 
system and zero otherwise. Mortality is the log of the annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19th century. Catholic is the 
percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the religion of “Roman Catholic”. Protestant is the percentage of the population of each country that 
belonged to the religion of “Protestant”. Other Religions is the percentage of the population of each country which does not belong to the religion of “Roman Catholic, 
Protestant and Muslim”. Economic Control includes GDP per capita adjusted for PPP and the number of total listed companies. Institution Control includes indicators on 
government efficiency, control of corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law from World Government Indicators. Year dummy variables are included in all 
regressions and t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 CV(Debt)  CV(Debt)  CV(Debt)  CV(Debt)  CV(Debt)  CV(Debt)  HHI(Debt) Gini(Debt) 
Creditor Rights Index 0.617***    0.345 0.374* -0.008 0.002 
 [2.981]    [0.782] [1.668] [-1.075] [0.325] 
Civil Law  -2.218***   -1.431 -2.734*** -0.073*** -0.108*** 
  [-3.803]   [-1.270] [-3.422] [-3.231] [-5.698] 
Mortality   -1.179***  -1.252***    
   [-2.922]  [-2.955]    
Catholic    0.012*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
    [3.099] [0.394] [4.794] [3.837] [4.400] 
Protestant    0.012* -0.017 0.016** 0.000 0.001** 
    [1.838] [-0.510] [2.026] [0.299] [2.211] 
Other Religions    0.009 -0.026 0.002 0.001* 0.001** 
    [1.075] [-1.068] [0.178] [1.889] [2.036] 
Economic Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Institution Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Countries 67 70 26 68 25 65 65 65 
Intercept -1.435 1.409 4.389* -1.002 24.798*** -2.034 0.040 0.235*** 
 [-1.487] [1.428] [1.744] [-1.082] [2.942] [-0.739] [0.428] [2.881] 
R-square 0.517 0.524 0.664 0.514 0.681 0.529 0.084 0.287 





Appendix: Variable Description 
Variable  Description 
 Firm Level Variables 
MarketCap Market capitalization for each company in each year. Source: Worldscope, item8002. 
Total Asset Total asset for each company in each year. Source: Worldscope, item2999. 
Total Debt Total liabilities for each company in each year. Source: Worldscope, item3351. 
Firm Income Net sales or revenues in U.S. dollars for each company in each year. Source: Worldscope, item7240. 
Employee The number of employees for each company in each year. Source: Worldscope, item7011. 
 External Finance Inequality Indicators 
CV(Equity)  The standard deviation over the mean of market capitalization over total asset for each country in each 
year. 𝐶𝑉(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦) = 𝑆. 𝐷. (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) / 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)  
HHI(Equity) The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of market capitalization over total asset for each country in each year. 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖  , where 𝑆𝑖 is the weight of firm i’s equity financing to total equity market in each 
country each year, measured by 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡. 
Gini(Equity) The Gini ratio of market capitalization over total asset for each country in each year.  








𝑖−1  , where 𝑋𝑖 is the firm i’s ability of fund raising by 
equity in each year which is captured by 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡. 
CV(Debt)  The standard deviation over the mean of total debt over total asset for each country in each year.  
𝐶𝑉(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡) =  𝑆. 𝐷. (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)⁄  . 
HHI(Debt) The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of total debt over total asset for each country in each year. 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖  , where 𝑆𝑖 is the weight of firm i’s debt financing to total debt market in each country 
each year, measured by 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡. 
Gini(Debt) The Gini ratio of total debt over total asset for each country in each year.  








𝑖−1  , where 𝑋𝑖 is the firm i’s ability of fund raising by debt 
which is captured by 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡. 
 Other Inequality Indicators 
Gini(Size) The Gini ratio of firm size, measured by the number of employees.  








𝑖−1  , where 𝑋𝑖 is the firm i’s number of employees. 
CV(Revenues) The standard deviation over the mean of firm income for each country in each year. 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 =  𝑆. 𝐷. (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)⁄   
Gini(Income) Gini index of income distribution of a nation’s residents. Source: World Bank 
 Country Level Institutional Environments 
Stock Market The market capitalization of listed domestic companies divide by GDP (%). Source: World Bank. 
Debt Market Liquid liabilities divide by GDP (%). Source: World Bank.  
Anti-Director 
Rights Index 
The quality of legal protection on minority shareholders in a given country and ranges from 0-6. It includes 
six key components: 1) proxy by mail allowed, (2) shares not blocked before shareholder meeting, (3) 
cumulative voting/proportional representation, (4) oppressed minority protection, (5) pre-emptive rights 
to new share issues, and (6) percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Each 
component is a dummy variable and the index is formed by aggregating the value of all six components. 
Source: Spamann (2010). 
Creditor Rights 
Index 
An index measures the quality of creditor right protection in a given country. Source: Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer (2007). 
Civil Law A dummy variable equals to one for countries with civil law system and zero otherwise, including French 
Legal Origin, German Legal Origin, and Scandinavian Legal Origin. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2008). 
Mortality The log of the annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in European colonies in the early 19th 
century. Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003).  
Catholic The percentage of the population of each country in 1980 that belonged to the religion of “Roman 
Catholic”. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999). 
Protestants The percentage of the population of each country in 1980 that belonged to the religion of “Protestant”. 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999). 
Other 
Religions 
The percentage of the population of each country in 1980 which are not belonged to the religion of 




Two economic development control variables: (1) GDP per Capita: GDP per Capita adjusted for PPP 
(Source: World Bank) and (2) List: the number of total listed companies. (Source: Worldscope) 
Institution 
Control 
Four institutional environment variables including indicators on: (1) Government Efficiency, (2) Control 
of Corruption, (3) Regulatory Quality and (4) Rule of Law. Source: World Government Indicators. 
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Online Appendix 1: Stock Market Development and Inequity in Equity Financing 
Country Stock Market Ranking CV(Equity) Ranking HHI(Equity) Ranking Gini(Equity) Ranking 
Argentina 14.56 56 3.34 45 0.26 55 0.73 52 
Australia 109.16 9 20.47 68 0.31 59 0.82 61 
Austria 32.33 41 1.30 17 0.04 20 0.49 16 
Belgium 69.62 19 4.29 50 0.33 62 0.66 46 
Botswana . . 1.09 15 0.10 36 0.47 13 
Brazil 52.73 23 5.24 52 0.27 57 0.76 55 
Bulgaria 12.17 58 4.91 51 0.17 47 0.75 54 
Canada 119.42 8 28.28 69 0.37 64 0.97 69 
Chile 107.60 10 7.72 56 0.42 66 0.88 66 
China 55.72 22 20.35 67 0.27 56 0.77 57 
Colombia 44.00 28 1.04 12 0.05 25 0.46 12 
Croatia 42.46 29 2.38 42 0.15 43 0.58 37 
Czech Republic 21.75 50 0.79 3 0.08 32 0.39 3 
Denmark 4.30 62 2.12 37 0.04 19 0.49 19 
Egypt 33.27 40 1.43 22 0.02 13 0.49 18 
Finland 6.67 60 0.90 5 0.02 11 0.42 7 
France 79.51 16 8.17 58 0.22 53 0.67 47 
Germany 45.72 25 8.82 62 0.17 48 0.72 51 
Greece 35.89 35 2.35 41 0.08 31 0.58 34 
Hong Kong 972.82 1 14.85 65 0.28 58 0.83 62 
Hungary 20.78 52 1.59 28 0.12 40 0.54 26 
Iceland . . 0.67 1 0.09 34 0.35 1 
India 78.43 18 13.53 64 0.17 46 0.74 53 
Indonesia 40.34 33 2.80 43 0.05 24 0.62 43 
Ireland 46.85 24 1.92 34 0.09 35 0.58 38 
Israel 78.52 17 8.24 59 0.18 49 0.80 59 
Italy 25.99 46 1.48 26 0.02 9 0.52 23 
Jamaica 8.02 59 1.76 31 0.22 52 0.60 40 
Japan 84.83 12 1.96 35 0.00 1 0.53 24 
Jordan 83.79 13 0.97 9 0.01 7 0.42 6 
Kazakhstan 22.47 49 1.80 32 0.18 50 0.65 45 
Kenya 18.48 54 1.33 18 0.06 28 0.55 29 
Kuwait 25.46 47 0.97 10 0.01 6 0.41 4 





Online Appendix 1 – Continued  
Country Stock Market Ranking CV(Equity) Ranking HHI(Equity) Ranking Gini(Equity) Ranking 
Lithuania . . 0.92 6 0.06 29 0.43 8 
Luxembourg 147.50 5 1.67 30 0.12 38 0.55 30 
Malaysia 138.31 6 8.00 57 0.16 44 0.63 44 
Malta 40.89 30 1.35 20 0.14 42 0.56 31 
Mexico 34.66 37 1.48 25 0.07 30 0.49 17 
Morocco 31.96 42 0.97 8 0.03 18 0.49 15 
Netherlands 87.97 11 8.58 61 0.48 67 0.85 63 
New Zealand 34.83 36 2.26 39 0.05 23 0.60 39 
Nigeria 13.26 57 2.23 38 0.11 37 0.62 42 
Norway 58.22 21 3.55 47 0.14 41 0.67 48 
Oman 44.28 27 0.96 7 0.03 16 0.44 11 
Pakistan 26.25 45 2.28 40 0.03 14 0.61 41 
Peru 45.15 26 1.99 36 0.09 33 0.58 35 
Philippines 67.46 20 8.34 60 0.35 63 0.96 68 
Poland 33.58 39 6.02 53 0.17 45 0.67 49 
Portugal 34.64 38 1.07 14 0.05 22 0.50 20 
Romania 6.51 61 1.57 27 0.03 15 0.52 21 
Russia 26.38 44 10.48 63 0.40 65 0.82 60 
Saudi Arabia 40.61 32 0.89 4 0.02 8 0.42 5 
Singapore 231.44 3 4.11 48 0.06 27 0.58 36 
Slovenia 21.54 51 1.60 29 0.12 39 0.56 32 
South Africa 248.43 2 7.59 55 0.32 60 0.70 50 
Spain 80.06 15 1.40 21 0.02 10 0.54 25 
Sri Lanka 24.31 48 1.43 23 0.02 12 0.52 22 
Sweden . . 1.46 24 0.01 5 0.55 28 
Switzerland 214.95 4 1.87 33 0.03 17 0.57 33 
Thailand 80.21 14 1.04 11 0.01 2 0.44 10 
Tunisia 18.09 55 1.17 16 0.05 21 0.54 27 
Turkey 27.88 43 1.34 19 0.01 4 0.48 14 
Ukraine 3.77 63 3.50 46 0.32 61 0.76 56 
United Arab Emirates 37.22 34 7.42 54 0.67 69 0.87 64 
United Kingdom 40.64 31 15.29 66 0.19 51 0.77 58 
United States 128.45 7 40.69 70 0.25 54 1.00 70 
Venezuela . . 4.20 49 0.86 70 0.87 65 
Vietnam 19.72 53 1.04 13 0.01 3 0.43 9 
Zimbabwe . . 3.23 44 0.61 68 0.90 67 
Missing value in Stock Market is due to the data limit from World Bank while the inequality indicators (CV(Equity), HHI(Equity), Gini(Equity)) is from Worldscope. 
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Online Appendix 2: Debt Market Development and Inequity in Debt Financing 
Country Debt Market Ranking CV(Debt) Ranking HHI(Debt) Ranking Gini(Debt) Ranking 
Argentina 22.34 67 0.85 29 0.02 24 0.32 22 
Australia 87.75 21 22.46 67 0.34 64 0.90 68 
Austria 78.83 22 0.90 30 0.03 27 0.30 16 
Belgium 104.99 13 4.81 51 0.40 68 0.59 60 
Botswana 33.94 59 0.59 13 0.06 36 0.32 20 
Brazil 58.61 37 6.61 58 0.28 60 0.68 62 
Bulgaria 62.95 32 2.79 48 0.05 31 0.56 56 
Canada 42.91 49 28.18 68 0.37 66 0.98 69 
Chile 36.51 56 1.76 40 0.02 22 0.42 42 
China 149.09 5 29.48 69 0.33 63 0.78 65 
Colombia 20.60 69 0.69 23 0.02 19 0.37 34 
Croatia 62.45 35 0.72 24 0.02 14 0.32 23 
Czech Republic 65.26 29 0.66 20 0.06 38 0.36 31 
Denmark 58.41 38 2.48 47 0.07 45 0.57 57 
Egypt 72.16 27 0.60 14 0.01 7 0.32 17 
Finland 62.51 34 1.82 42 0.07 44 0.34 25 
France 78.71 23 9.69 63 0.28 59 0.53 52 
Germany 75.51 25 8.18 61 0.15 55 0.56 55 
Greece 90.01 19 6.28 57 0.36 65 0.57 58 
Hong Kong 283.67 1 19.59 66 0.38 67 0.80 67 
Hungary 51.39 43 1.25 36 0.14 54 0.41 40 
Iceland 68.16 28 0.25 1 0.05 34 0.14 1 
India 64.28 31 7.49 59 0.07 47 0.46 46 
Indonesia 31.09 64 1.83 43 0.02 18 0.38 35 
Ireland 111.71 10 1.38 38 0.06 37 0.46 47 
Israel 78.04 24 5.19 53 0.12 53 0.54 54 
Italy 72.38 26 0.44 6 0.00 3 0.22 4 
Jamaica 45.38 47 0.64 17 0.05 33 0.34 26 
Japan 189.83 3 0.52 10 0.00 1 0.26 7 
Jordan 113.73 8 0.77 25 0.01 9 0.42 43 
Kazakhstan 29.83 65 0.82 27 0.03 28 0.33 24 
Kenya 33.86 60 0.48 7 0.02 21 0.27 9 
Kuwait 62.74 33 0.64 18 0.01 6 0.35 30 




Online Appendix 2 – Continued 
Country Debt Market Ranking CV(Debt) Ranking HHI(Debt) Ranking Gini(Debt) Ranking 
Lithuania 41.79 51 0.51 8 0.04 30 0.28 13 
Luxembourg 201.51 2 0.84 28 0.04 29 0.42 41 
Malaysia 113.08 9 11.01 64 0.22 58 0.62 61 
Malta 131.89 6 0.44 5 0.05 35 0.24 6 
Mexico 23.87 66 1.31 37 0.06 40 0.32 18 
Morocco 91.46 16 0.41 4 0.02 15 0.23 5 
Netherlands 101.42 14 5.82 55 0.28 61 0.57 59 
New Zealand 43.41 48 2.30 46 0.07 42 0.48 51 
Nigeria 16.73 70 0.65 19 0.01 12 0.27 10 
Norway 48.97 45 2.25 45 0.08 49 0.36 32 
Oman 34.88 57 0.60 15 0.02 13 0.32 21 
Pakistan 37.62 54 0.79 26 0.01 5 0.30 14 
Peru 33.18 61 1.15 35 0.02 23 0.35 27 
Philippines 54.44 41 8.45 62 0.42 69 0.76 64 
Poland 48.16 46 4.87 52 0.09 51 0.48 50 
Portugal 89.22 20 0.36 3 0.02 20 0.18 2 
Romania 32.09 62 0.92 31 0.01 11 0.44 45 
Russia 38.79 52 5.32 54 0.11 52 0.48 49 
Saudi Arabia 49.44 44 0.67 22 0.01 10 0.35 28 
Singapore 109.94 11 4.38 50 0.07 46 0.43 44 
Slovenia 54.68 40 0.56 11 0.03 26 0.30 15 
South Africa 37.97 53 6.10 56 0.20 57 0.54 53 
Spain 93.59 15 0.66 21 0.01 8 0.27 12 
Sri Lanka 31.20 63 1.73 39 0.08 48 0.39 36 
Sweden 53.41 42 1.78 41 0.02 16 0.37 33 
Switzerland 150.79 4 1.88 44 0.07 41 0.40 39 
Thailand 91.04 18 3.74 49 0.08 50 0.47 48 
Tunisia 57.46 39 0.51 9 0.02 17 0.26 8 
Turkey 37.53 55 1.02 33 0.01 4 0.39 37 
Ukraine 34.06 58 1.08 34 0.03 25 0.35 29 
United Arab Emirates 59.76 36 7.67 60 0.63 70 0.79 66 
United Kingdom 128.74 7 13.42 65 0.15 56 0.70 63 
United States 64.49 30 47.83 70 0.30 62 0.99 70 
Venezuela 22.30 68 0.58 12 0.05 32 0.32 19 
Vietnam 91.30 17 0.62 16 0.00 2 0.27 11 




Online Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  (1) Stock Market Development 1.000 
  (2) Debt Market Development 0.615* 1.000 
  (3) CV(Equity)  0.209* 0.178* 1.000 
  (4) HHI(Equity) 0.092 -0.002 0.575* 1.000 
  (5) Gini(Equity) 0.187* 0.085 0.705* 0.776* 1.000 
  (6) CV(Debt)  0.251* 0.236* 0.762* 0.295* 0.521* 1.000 
  (7) HHI(Debt) 0.165* 0.171* 0.421* 0.439* 0.462* 0.686* 1.000 
  (8) Gini(Debt) 0.267* 0.225* 0.643* 0.396* 0.598* 0.782* 0.798* 1.000 
* indicates significance at the .01 level  
 
 
 
